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BOOK REVIEW
Trade Policies and Developing Nations. By Anne 0. Krueger. Wash-
ington: The Brookings Institution, 1995.
Leonard Bierman*
This book is part of a 22-volume series published by the Brook-
ings Institution dealing with the issue of "Integrating National Econo-
mies." The goal of the series is to examine problems which can ensue
from economic globalization in a world of sovereign nation-states.
More specifically, the series focuses on the lowering of world trade
barriers and the lowering of economic distances between nations due
to increased technology which has occurred since World War II. The
result is that the line between "international" and "domestic" policies
is today often blurred, and there are considerable "cross-border spil-
lovers" (i.e., pollution). Among nations, problems such as these are
generally best dealt with through inter-governmental cooperation in-
cluding the formation of regional pacts such as the European Commu-
nity (EC). All of this, of course, threatens the autonomy and
sovereignty of individual nation-states.
This particular volume in the series deals with the issue of world
economic integration from the perspective of developing countries. It
is written by Professor Anne 0. Krueger of the economics department
at Stanford University. Professor Krueger was formerly vice presi-
dent of economics and research at the World Bank and is well known
for her research and writing regarding developing countries. Reviews
of other volumes in this Brookings Institution series have been pub-
lished previously in this Journal.'
Professor Krueger begins her analysis by focusing on the "import
substitution" policies of developing countries in the early post-World
War II era. While industrialized countries were removing trade barri-
ers and lowering tariffs during this period, developing countries were
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trying to insulate their economies from the rest of the world. At the
heart of this developing country strategy was the replacement or sub-
stitution of imported goods with domestically produced goods pro-
tected by government mandates-hence the term "import
substitution" policies. Developing countries adopted these policies, in
large measure, in response to their colonial pasts. The countries felt
that they had suffered economically because of prior economic depen-
dence on richer countries and wanted a break from this past. The idea
was to attain economic growth and prosperity through economic
independence.
The entire thrust of Professor Krueger's book is that such "im-
port substitution" policies did not and do not work. Krueger main-
tains that the only way for developing countries to make economic
progress is through "outer-oriented" economic and trade policies.
She illustrates this point by discussing at some length the situation of
the East Asian newly industrializing countries (NICs), namely Hong
Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan.
Krueger notes that per capita incomes in Taiwan and Korea, for
example, were extremely low in the early 1950s and that each of these
countries had experienced severe economic difficulties. However, by
shifting from insular "import substitution" economic policies to outer-
oriented, export-driven trade policies, these countries experienced
phenomenal economic growth. Korea, for example, increased its ex-
ports from $31 million in 1960 to $882 million in 1970 and more than
doubled its real GDP in the same period. Debunking assertions that
economic growth in East Asia represented a special situation, she
points to Chile and Turkey as more recent examples of how trade
openness led to improved economic performance.
She concludes the first portion of her book by arguing that an
economic strategy of "import substitution" cannot sustain growth.
She notes that such policies may work for some period of time and
that there will be a variety of vested interests wishing to keep the
given domestic economy sheltered. Over time, though, she argues
that economic growth in such a construct is extremely difficult to
maintain and that, for developing countries to continue to grow, they
need to rely on the international market.
Part Two of her book deals with the role of developing countries
in the international economy, particularly the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). She notes that GATT made special provi-
sions for developing countries, especially Article XVIII: B. This Arti-
cle allowed developing countries to more easily adopt quantitative
Trade Policies and Developing Nations
16:547 (1996)
and other restrictions on imports and to both be members of GATT
and pursue "import substitution" trade policies. In addition, in the
mid-1970s, the developing countries formulated the Generalized Sys-
tem of Preference (GSP), which subjected exports from developing
countries to lower rates of duty than comparable exports from other
developed countries. However, despite these provisions, Krueger
notes that developing countries played no major role in GATT until
the 1980s and the recently concluded Uruguay Round of negotiations.
Krueger then goes through an excellent and very useful discus-
sion of the impact of the Uruguay Round of GATr negotiations on
developing countries. During the Uruguay Round, developing coun-
tries, for the first time, sought to influence the outcome of the trade
negotiations rather than simply wait for reciprocal tariff reductions
among developed countries and then, as Krueger puts it, "free ride"
on those reductions. Numerous provisions of the Uruguay Round di-
rectly impact developing countries.
First, the Uruguay Round commits nearly all GATr countries to
phase out all quantitative restrictions such as import quotas. The only
exception is for "least developed countries," defined as countries with
per capita incomes under $1,000. The Uruguay Round creates differ-
ent rules and timetables for "developed countries," "developing coun-
tries," and the "least developed countries" noted above.
With respect to the phaseout of quantitative restrictions, Krueger
notes that perhaps the most important is the ten-year phaseout of the
Multifiber Arrangement (MFA). The MFA has, since the 1950s, im-
posed quantitative limits on the amount of textile and apparel imports
into industrialized countries. Krueger cites statistics that the tariff
equivalent of MFA quotas was 48 percent for textiles and 23 percent
for apparel for the United States in 1990. Because of this, U.S. con-
sumers annually paid over $8 billion more for apparel and textiles
than they would have without the MFA. The phaseout of the MFA
will, thus, be a major boon for developing countries exporting low-
cost textiles and apparel. Krueger cites statistics that world trade in
textiles and apparel may increase between 34 and 60 percent once the
MFA phaseout is completed.
Krueger also points out that the Uruguay Round will greatly lib-
eralize trade in agricultural commodities, benefiting developing coun-
tries that are net exporters. The agreement also reduces government
export subsidies and support for agriculture. Krueger cites estimates
that world trade in agricultural commodities should increase by ap-
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proximately 20 percent once the Uruguay Round's mandates are fully
phased-in.
While reductions in quantitative restrictions and in agricultural
subsidies were generally changes sought by developing countries, an-
other major Uruguay Round change, increased intellectual property
rights, was clearly sought by the developed countries. Krueger
presents a good discussion of the genesis of this Uruguay Round pro-
vision which provides protection for: copyrights, trademarks, indus-
trial designs, geographical indications, patents, layout designs of
integrated circuits, and undisclosed information. Developed countries
have one year from the effective date of the Uruguay Round to adopt
necessary protective legislation, while most developing countries have
five years to adopt national provisions protecting such intellectual
property.
Krueger notes that, in the short-run, many developing countries
will be hurt by these new intellectual property provisions, paying con-
siderably more for pharmaceuticals, reprinting rights for books, and
other items. Of course, in the long-run, better protection of intellec-
tual property rights should help spur creative research and develop-
ment of a kind which should help these countries. Nevertheless, there
will be short-run costs.
One exception Krueger notes, however, may be the East Asian
NICs. She points out that these countries are probably already far
enough advanced technologically to benefit immediately from the
Uruguay Round's stronger intellectual property protections.
A final point in this regard that Krueger highlights, although per-
haps not enough, is the administrative capacity of some of the devel-
oping countries to properly enforce intellectual property laws. She is
concerned that, to the extent scarce administrative resources are allo-
cated to this endeavor, they will be taken away from perhaps more
"worthy" concerns (imposing even greater costs on the given develop-
ing country). This seems to be a very valid point. Moreover, alloca-
tion issues aside, one might question whether the requisite
administrative infrastructures exist at all in some developing
countries.
Krueger ends her discussion of the impact of the Uruguay Round
negotiations on developing countries with a discussion of the issue of
trade in services. She accurately notes the increasing importance of
this area and the fact that the Uruguay Round provides for further
negotiations under the GATT/World Trade Organization (WTO) um-
brella. She notes that the resistance of developing countries against
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further negotiations in this area diminished as they realized they held
comparative advantages in various service areas - for example, con-
struction - and would thus benefit from greater market access.
In concluding her discussion, Krueger notes other aspects of the
agreement, such as the new dispute settlement procedures of the
WTO. She asserts, however, that these other aspects will not signifi-
cantly affect trade policies and administration in developing countries.
This contention seems open to some dispute. Indeed, some observers
have maintained that the new WTO dispute settlement mechanism
may well be the most important gain for developing countries in the
whole agreement. Under the former set of rules,' it was very easy for
any country to block a GATT panel ruling, and, as a result, developing
countries did not view the process as having much credibility. Under
the WTO, however, dispute settlement rules have been enhanced con-
siderably - for instance, it is now extremely difficult to block a panel
ruling. This could ultimately prove a boon to developing countries
since they will be able to register complaints under the GATT on a
more equal footing.
In the last part of the volume, Professor Krueger goes beyond the
Uruguay Round and looks at issues surrounding even deeper eco-
nomic integration of developing countries. In this regard, she gives
considerable attention to developments in both the EC and the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
Her core point here is that it may be easier for advanced develop-
ing countries to achieve deeper economic integration than commonly
thought. In particular, she points to the successful accession of Spain
and Portugal into the EC and to the fact that there was very little
opposition in Mexico to its joining the NAFrA. She notes that the
primary opposition was in the United States. This suggests it may be
resistance in developed countries, rather than difficulties in develop-
ing countries, which constrain deeper world economic integration.
In discussing the EC accessions, Krueger downplays the role that
transfers of funds from richer EC countries have played in smoothing
EC integration. She perhaps, however, dismisses this contention too
hastily. Under the European Union's structural fund formulas, Spain
receives approximately $3 billion annually, and Greece and Portugal
both receive over $1 billion per year. Moreover, these countries re-
ceive considerable inflows of private capital associated with their
membership in the European Union. Neither of these sources of capi-
tal is likely to be available to other, lesser developed countries ventur-
ing into deeper economic integration.
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In her discussion of the NAFTA and EC accession, Krueger is-
sues a sharp cautionary note regarding the subject of labor standards.
She forcefully points out that, for many developing countries, cheap
labor is their primary "comparative advantage." If more developed
countries impose worker safety and other labor standards on these
countries, they rob them of this comparative advantage and, in a
sense, "kill them with kindness." The idea is that, while intentions
may be good, these regulations increase the cost of labor and goods,
and ultimately decrease the number of jobs.
An analysis of this issue, however, should be more thorough.
First, what about workers in developed countries who lose jobs due to
greater integration with low-wage developing countries? This clearly
was and is the concern of both the AFL-CIO and Ross Perot regard-
ing Mexico's entry into the NAFTA. Formulating meaningful worker
adjustment programs in the United States and Canada is not easy.
Second, the Mexican situation is, in many ways, an easy one be-
cause Mexico already has a rather comprehensive set of laws protect-
ing basic worker rights. Thus, the goal of the labor side agreement to
the NAFTA between the United States, Canada, and Mexico is simply
to require each of the signatory countries to enforce its own labor
laws. The idea is that Mexico simply needs to enforce its own labor
laws. However, at present, many developing and semi-developing
countries do not have comprehensive laws protecting worker rights,
which creates rather stark differentials in national treatment.
As Krueger closes her text with a general valedictory about the
need for greater economic integration or lberalized trade, the word
"trust" comes to mind. Developing countries initiated insular "import
substitution" trade policies because they did not trust their former co-
lonial masters. Over the years, some of that distrust has melted away,
in some cases aided by billions of dollars of financial assistance. Nev-
ertheless, the trust issue still seems to be highly relevant. For exam-
ple, developing countries are trusting that large developed countries
will abide by the decisions of the new WTO dispute settlement mecha-
nism, and that they will fulfill their Uruguay Round commitment to
completely dismantle the Multifiber Arrangement by the year 2005.
Should this trust on the part of developing countries turn out to be
misplaced, we may well be back to square one.
